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ABSTRACT
The article is aimed at studying the Soviet fiscal policy and its effects on the coun-
try’s economic development in 1926–1940. We used a historical and logical method 
to research the effectiveness of the two instruments of taxation – the turnover tax 
and tax charges on profits – and their role in the impressive achievements of the 
Soviet economy. To analyze and compare the data we used the key indicators of 
economic development and tax collection for 1926–1940. The results of the analysis 
have confirmed our hypothesis that the turnover tax and tax charges on profits 
along with price regulation and planned economy led to the formation of a cost-
effective economic model in the USSR. We have shown that this model ensured 
constant reduction of production costs, accelerated growth of the urban population 
and unprecedented expansion of heavy industry. Radical simplification of the tax 
system, which was a part of the 1930s reform, not only had a considerable fiscal ef-
fect but also affected social development. The turnover tax and tax charges on prof-
its allowed the government to mobilize considerable resources for investment to 
stimulate growth in production of heavy industry at a rate of 10–16% a year, which 
created a multiplier effect in the whole economy. However, financial resources were 
mobilized at the expense of consumers, since higher taxes were mainly imposed on 
enterprises of light industry and food industry. This led to “commodity hunger”, 
the introduction of ration cards, and strict administration. It is concluded that the 
distinctive feature of the Soviet fiscal policy was its complex nature and subordina-
tion to the single goal of the country’s industrialization.
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АННОТАЦИЯ
Целью статьи является изучение опыта применения налога с оборота и отчис-
лений от прибыли в Советском Союзе в период с 1926 по 1940 г. Для исследова-
ния роли этих налогов в успехах индустриализации советской экономики мы 
использовали историко-логический метод. Мы анализировали и сравнивали 
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основные показатели, характеризующие развитие экономики и показатели, 
характеризующие сбор налогов до и после проведения налоговой реформы 
1930 г. Мы подтвердили гипотезу о том, что налог с оборота и отчисления от 
прибыли в условиях регулируемых цен и плановой экономики привели к фор-
мированию в СССР модели противозатратной экономики. Мы показали, что 
эта модель обеспечивала постоянное снижение издержек производства продук-
ции, форсированную урбанизацию населения и беспрецедентные темпы роста 
тяжелой промышленности. В результате реформы 1930 г. налоговая система 
была максимально упрощена, что обеспечило достижение значимого фискаль-
ного эффекта и ряда социальных эффектов. Два введенных специфических 
налоговых инструмента – налог с оборота и отчисления из прибыли предпри-
ятий в условиях плановой экономики позволили мобилизовать огромные ре-
сурсы для инвестиций. Инвестиции обеспечили рост производства в отраслях 
тяжелой промышленности 10–16 % в год, что привело к мультипликативному 
эффекту во всей экономике. Однако мобилизация финансовых ресурсов про-
исходила за счет потребителей, так как повышенными налогами облагались 
в основном предприятия легкой и пищевой промышленности. Это привело 
к «товарному голоду», введению продуктовых карточек, жесткому администра-
тивному управлению. Сделан вывод, что отличительной особенностью прово-
димой Советским Союзом фискальной политики был ее комплексный характер 
и подчинение единой ключевой цели индустриализации страны.
КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ СЛОВА
налог с оборота, отчисления от прибыли, индустриализация, плановая эконо-
мика, антизатратная экономика.
1. Relevance
Economic growth and technological 
innovation are the main priorities in the 
development of Russia. The country’s 
progress in this respect, however, is lim-
ited, to say the least. In order to achieve 
a major technological breakthrough, sub-
stantial investment is required, which 
means that there is a need for efficient 
instruments of taxation, capable of mobi-
lizing the necessary resources. In this con-
text, it would be interesting to look at the 
Soviet experience of designing and enforc-
ing its fiscal policy in the 1930s.
The tax reforms of the 1930s were, first 
and foremost, aimed at creating efficient 
instruments of taxation to provide suf-
ficient resources for accelerated industri-
alization. One cannot help but admit that 
the formula proposed by Soviet finance 
professionals successfully ensured accel-
erated urbanization and unprecedented 
growth of heavy industry during the 
country’s transition to the government-
controlled collective economic system. 
In the course of the three incomplete 
five-year-plan periods lasting from 1928 
to 1940, the country built 364 new towns, 
constructed and put into operation 9,000 
large production facilities – which makes 
an average of two facilities a day! The 
actual added value in sectors other than 
agriculture increased by an annual aver-
age of 10.4% [1; 2]. Within the centralized 
economic system, the tax policy became 
an effective instrument of achieving goals 
and implementing tasks set by the govern-
ment, which makes it extremely important 
to study this experience. 
During the world economic crisis of 
1929–1933, J. M. Keynes [2] proposed a 
comprehensive concept of economic reg-
ulation with a special emphasis on active 
fiscal policy. Practical implementation of 
the Keynesian concept enabled market 
economies to recover from the depres-
sion. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union, which 
had a planned economy and, therefore, 
completely different economic and politi-
cal conditions, focused on rapid indus-
trialization. In both market-driven and 
planned economies, the state and pro-
active tax policy played a decisive role in 
this process.
At the same time, the two types of 
economies used radically different com-
binations of taxes. J. M. Keynes suggested 
actively manipulating tax rates and gov-
ernment spending in order to implement 
discretionary and non-discretionary mon-
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etary policies. Soviet finance profession-
als, in their turn, designed a brand new 
formula of a tax reform. They suggested 
that the diverse taxes paid by enterprises 
be replaced with two main taxes – the 
turnover tax and the tax charges on prof-
its. Methodologically, these two different 
solutions had the same goal –strength-
ening the role of the state – and brought 
positive results in the respective types 
of economy. The legacy of Keynes has 
been studied fairly well, whereas the So-
viet positive taxation experience remains 
largely underexplored. Meanwhile, the 
unique nature of the Soviet tax reform in 
the period of a centrally planned economy 
is worthy of scholarly attention. 
This article aims to study the expe-
rience of the Soviet fiscal reform, which 
included the introduction of the turnover 
tax and tax charges on profits, and the 
role of this reform in the success of Soviet 
industrialization in the 1930s. It should 
be noted that we are going to focus exclu-
sively on the economic outcomes of the 
fiscal policy rather than consider its social 
effects. Our hypothesis is that the turn-
over tax and tax charges on profits along 
with the price regulation and planned 
economy allowed the Soviet government 
to establish a cost-effective economic 
model, which involved optimization of 
production costs, accelerated growth of 
the urban population and unprecedented 
expansion of heavy industry. 
2. Literature review
The analysis of the research literature 
reveals a certain interest that researchers 
had in the Soviet tax policy in the indus-
trialization period. There is no, however, 
uniform opinion among Soviet and Rus-
sian economists about the impact of the 
tax policy on economic growth. As Ta-
ble 1 illustrates, in different periods re-
searchers focused on different aspects of 
the problem. 
The differences in the scope of these 
studies can be explained by the differenc-
es in the subject matter of the research and 
the differences in the approaches applied 
to assess the reform’s outcomes. For exam-
ple, Soviet economists in the 1930s–1960s 
focused on the mechanism of realizing the 
tax reform, assessed its progress and chal-
lenges [3–13]. In the 1960s-1990s, research-
ers were more interested in improving 
the tax system existing at that time. It is 
worth noting that the works of that period 
are somewhat biased, which negatively 
affected their search for solutions to con-
temporary economic problems. 
Post-Soviet studies also differ in their 
assessment of the role of the tax reforms in 
the Soviet economic policy. For example, 
N. P. Figurnova [14], A. I. Kolganov and 
A. V. Buzgalin [15] view them as a “rob-
bery” that led to the impoverishment of 
people in rural areas, that is, the majority 
of the Soviet population. I. V. Karavayeva 
and V. A. Maltsev [16] view the turnover 
Table 1
Studies of the Soviet tax reform in the industrialization period
Studies of the 1930s–1960s Studies of the 1960s–1990s Post-Soviet studies
Authors A. M. Alexandrov,
P. V. Mikeladze, 
P. I. Polozov, 
M. I. Lifshits, 
A. A. Sokolov et al.
D. L. Argova,
E. A. Voznesensky,
V. P. Dyachenko, 
G. L. Rabinovich,
A. A. Barsov et al.
I. V. Karavayeva
V. A. Maltsev, 
N. P. Figurnova, 
V. Y. Katasonov, 
A. I. Kolganov, 
A. V. Buzgalin, 
V. M. Pushkareva,
I. A. Mayburov
A. P. Kireenko et al.
Focus of 
research
Implementation of the tax 
reform, its outcomes and its 
complications
Improvements to the 
existing taxation system 
Outcomes of the tax 
reform
Results This reform presents a 
completely new approach to 
taxation based on the principle 
of comprehensiveness 
Detailed description of the 
taxation instruments
Assessment of the 
reform’s outcomes
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tax as a way of channeling funds from 
agriculture to manufacturing. V. Y. Kata-
sonov [17] takes a different perspective: 
he agrees that the turnover tax helped to 
provide more funding for industrial de-
velopment and explains the role of this tax 
in building a cost-effective economy. As 
for the studies of specific taxation instru-
ments, they tend to analyze the current 
taxation practices within the framework 
of Western economic theories [18–22]. 
Earlier international studies of the So-
viet economy suffered from the absence of 
plausible data and, therefore, were largely 
critical of the collectivization methods. 
There is only a handful of studies that take 
a comprehensive look at the Soviet system 
of taxation (e.g. R. W. Davies [23; 24] and 
[23; 25]). J. R. Millar [26], too, argues that 
industrialization was carried out at the 
expense of the rural population and the 
city poor. At the same time, he observes 
that the taxation system of that period 
was based on the dominating ideology 
of planned economy and on fundamental 
political and cultural concepts.
The authors of more recent works 
recognize the achievements of the Soviet 
economy without political bias. They ad-
mit that the input data were of insufficient 
quality and continue to be revised many 
years on. Moreover, P. Wanless [27] sees it 
as a mistake to disregard the issue of taxa-
tion in Socialist countries, especially the 
market elements of tax policies. 
Some studies also confirm that the So-
viet economy was on the rise and the living 
standards were improving. For example, 
consumption per capita increased by 21% 
between 1928 and 1939 (average annual 
growth of 1.8%), which refutes the assump-
tion that as a result of industrialization, the 
living standards were sacrificed for the 
sake of producing ever-growing amounts 
of steel and armaments. The question is 
whether there were any alternatives to the 
socially disastrous collectivization cam-
paign or not. The simulation models con-
structed by R. C. Allen [28] show that the 
ultimate results of industrialization could 
have been achieved if the New Economic 
Policy had been continued. The models do 
not specify, however, the sources of man-
power. At the same time, Allen admits that 
the social disaster brought about by collec-
tivization had even worse repercussions 
for rural-urban migration.
A. A. Barsov [29], J. Millar [30; 31], and 
M. Ellman [32] established that the net 
profit was not transferred from agriculture 
to the rest of the economy, so the capital 
accrued in agriculture was not the source 
of investment in manufacturing. The turn-
over tax on consumer goods (primarily 
processed agricultural produce) was in-
deed used to finance growing investment, 
but in fact consumption was not reduced 
in order to obtain investment resources. 
Investment grew due to the mobilization 
of workers, who would otherwise have 
remained unemployed. Part of the work-
force was used to expand the production 
of capital goods (known as Group A in-
dustry) and boost investment growth. The 
government procurement system sped up 
the process, thus decreasing consump-
tion in rural areas as compared to cities 
and increasing rural-urban migration as a 
result. Allen [28] names two defining fac-
tors of the success of industrialization: an 
investment strategy that prioritized heavy 
industry and a combination of high indus-
trial output targets and not-so-rigid bud-
getary constraints. 
The success of industrialization 
impressed many Western experts. Ac-
cording to S. Wheatcroft [33], the Soviet 
industrial output grew 2.5–3.5-fold be-
tween 1928 and 1937 (an average annual 
growth of 10.5 to 16%). Harrisson, how-
ever, notes that the official Soviet statis-
tics exaggerated the long-run economic 
growth, pointing out that the labor pro-
ductivity indicators should be taken with 
a grain of salt [34]. 
3. Analysis of budgetary and tax reforms 
in the USSR in 1928–1937
Both the fiscal policy and the instru-
ments to implement it were developed 
by Soviet economists. These instruments 
were adjusted to maximize the results of 
the tax reform. In December 1925, the So-
viet government set the task to “ensure in-
dustrialization” of the country and in 1928, 
the first five-year-plan was launched. The 
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plan envisaged the construction of several 
dozen modern heavy industry “giants” 
[30]. It was necessary to ensure an accel-
erated growth in Group A output (capital 
goods) in comparison to Group B produc-
tion (consumer goods), which brought to 
the forefront the problem of funding. 
Specific characteristics of budgetary 
and taxation instruments were deter-
mined by the general operational pecu-
liarities of the Soviet economy (Figure 1). 
As a result, the Soviet planned econ-
omy functioned as a single mechanism 
operated from the center, “manually” or 
“automatically”, mainly through prices 
and mandatory levies on enterprises, in-
cluding taxes.
In the brief preparatory period before 
the reform in 1926–1928, the amount and 
sources of the required resources were de-
termined. Despite an increase in industry 
savings (accumulated depreciation and 
profits increased by nearly 60% from 1925 
till 1928), it was not enough. As a result, 
to fund industrialization, it was decided 
to use the funds accumulated in other in-
dustries and by people. It was also stipu-
lated that the search for sources of savings 
should be accompanied by the all-round 
production cost cutting measures. As a re-
sult, in 1926 around 1billion roubles was 
invested in the manufacturing industry, 
which meant a 150% increase in compari-
son with the previous year. In 1926–1928, 
the number of large production facilities 
doubled, while the gross output grew by 
132% in comparison with 1913.
In 1930–1932, the new ideological 
base was used as a foundation for a com-
prehensive reform of the budgetary and 
tax systems and credit relations existing 
at that time. The reform aimed to create 
a mechanism that would help increase 
industrial savings by promoting self-fi-
nancing (khozraschet) and by incentivizing 
enterprises economically. The budgetary 
and tax reform led to the creation of a cost-
effective economy. Other results of the re-
form include the following:
– a steady growth in public revenue; 
– uninterrupted and systematic rev-
enue dynamics;
– cutting production costs cost;
– a steady growth in labor produc-
tivity;
– improvement in the living stan-
dards.
The reform was based on a compre-
hensive approach and covered the system 
of settlements, lending, government ex-
penditures, insurance, taxes and compul-
sory levies on individuals [35]. Taxation 
instruments and other compulsory charg-
es paid by enterprises were at the core of 
the new state financing mechanism. The 
new taxation system was built upon the 
following premises: 
1. The means of production, material 
and supplies were publicly owned.
2. Administration methods in the 
national economy combined directive 
planning of all the key targets and self-
financing (commercial financing). The lat-
ter policy was enforced by incentivizing 
companies economically. 
3. Pricing targets, production cost tar-
gets and profit targets were mandatory 
(set through directives) for enterprises.
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Prices were set by the state
The state owned the means of production and retained ownership even in 
case of their transfer
Distribution relations were determined by a plan designed for each industry; 
means of production took the form of goods and their value, only needed for 
the purposes of accounting, calculation and payments
Conventionality of money and value of goods, especially of means of production
Enterprises were expected to meet the in-kind goals: coal production, metals 
production, cast iron output etc.
Figure 1. Characteristics of the planned economy in the USSR
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4. Rigid distribution of resources and 
manufactured products was controlled 
from the single government center.
5. Revenues were to be remitted to the 
state budget on a regular basis and in suf-
ficient amounts.
6. Permanent financial control over 
the fulfillment of the plan and financial 
and budgetary discipline was to be ex-
ecuted. 
The enforcement of the new principles 
required both rigid command methods 
and indirect instruments such as the new 
taxation mechanism of generating public 
revenue for its further distribution. The 
key instruments of the mechanism were 
tax charges on corporate income and the 
turnover tax that was levied as a percent-
age of the product price. The tax was to 
be remitted to the state regardless of the 
enterprise’s performance. 
The new taxation mechanism was the 
product of the radical tax reform of 1930. 
As a result of the reform, the tax system 
was simplified to the maximum: the sys-
tem of excise taxes was practically abol-
ished; the diversity of corporate taxes was 
reduced to the two main levies – the turn-
over tax and tax charges on profits. 
The turnover tax replaced 53 taxes 
and non-tax payments, including trade 
tax, practically all local taxes and charges. 
The tax was computed using the differ-
ence method on the basis of fixed prices of 
goods turned out by different industries. 
In general, the Soviet understanding of tax 
was different from the understanding of 
tax in a market economy. The main feature 
of the turnover tax is a variety of tax rates: 
in 1933, there were over 400 tax rates; in 
1937, 1,109; taking into consideration the 
regional differences in food prices, 2,444. 
The tax was only simplified somewhat 
during the pre-war period: the number of 
rates was reduced; the difference method 
was abolished for a number of industrial 
goods [36]. 
Charges on profits replaced five other 
taxes, including the corporate income tax 
paid by state-owned companies and the 
excess profits tax. Essentially, this meant 
direct extraction of the larger portion of 
profit into the budget. Tax charges on 
profits were even less in line with the ac-
cepted market model of computing corpo-
ration tax and, consequently, had a quasi-
tax nature. 
The turnover tax and charges on profit 
created an effective system of total control 
over enterprises’ operations, motivating 
them to keep cutting their production costs. 
Pricing issues were considered crucial 
in the Soviet fiscal policy. Prices were set 
by the planning agency and were used 
for accounting, computing and settlement 
purposes. The Soviet state used the pric-
ing policy for such critical economic func-
tions as distribution and utilization of the 
national income, promoting the circula-
tion of commodities and so on. 
The wholesale price in heavy industry 
(“production of the means of production”) 
was the price at which products were dis-
tributed among state-owned companies 
under the material and supplies plan. The 
cost-based approach was at the core of price 
planning, that is, the price was set at the 
level equal to the cost of production plus 
planned profit (the company’s net income) 
that was calculated on the basis of the in-
dustry’s planned profitability. The cost of 
production was assumed to be an industry-
wide average including the performance 
of the leading enterprises. Differences in 
planned profitability by industry corre-
sponded to the differences in the speed of 
fixed assets renewal, their structure and the 
periods of working capital turnover.
Financial performance of companies 
was measured as the difference between 
the government-fixed product prices and 
the cost of manufacturing these products 
with the turnover tax. If a company ex-
ceeded the target cost of production, it 
would not meet its earnings target; if it 
managed to reduce the cost of production 
to the level below planned, it would have 
excess earnings. As the company had no 
say in the statutorily set prices, its earn-
ings, the rate of the turnover tax and the 
output volume were entirely a function 
of the cost of production. Consequently, 
cost cutting was of critical importance for 
the growth in earnings and it was the sole 
factor influencing earnings and the fulfill-
ment of the profit plan. 
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Enterprises usually retained their 
profits to use them for a planned increase 
in fixed investments. Profits in excess of 
fixed investments were extracted into the 
state budget as charges on profit. The re-
maining part of the “excess profit” was 
spent on welfare support for the staff. If 
a company did not have enough profits 
to increase its working capital and fixed 
investment, the shortfall was covered by 
the government. The amount of public 
funding to be received by the company 
was computed on the basis of planned 
earnings. A failure to meet the profit ac-
cumulation target placed the company in 
a tense financial position.
In some cases, the cost of production 
was planned at a level higher than pro-
ducer prices (which meant the company 
operated at a planned loss). As a result, 
companies turning out such products 
could not fully recover their production 
costs by selling them. The resulting short-
fall was covered with government-pro-
vided subsidies [37]. 
The state was therefore able to build 
a mechanism of resource re-distribution 
among industries while executing full ad-
ministrative control over the operations of 
enterprises. The key instruments of such 
resource redistribution were the turnover 
tax and tax charges of profits. 
4. Specific mechanism  
of tax charges on profits
Tax charges on profits were intro-
duced in 1930 by the Statute on Taxing 
Profits of State-Owned Enterprises1. The 
statute defined the following features of 
these tax charges. First, the tax was com-
puted and paid in a decentralized way – 
companies were in charge of computing, 
accounting and paying the tax on all kinds 
of planned profits. Second, the tax rates 
were differentiated by industry and re-
vised annually, varying from 10 to 85% 
of profits. If the planned profit exceeded 
fixed investments (including an increase 
in working capital), a higher tax rate was 
applied. However, a small share of profits 
1 Decree on the deduction to the state income 
of state-owned enterprises. The collection of laws of 
the USSR. 1930, no. 46, art. 478. (In Russ.)
retained by companies could be viewed as 
an economic incentive for development. 
Third, the estimated tax was initially 
remitted on a monthly basis at a rate of 
85% of the planned profit, with a refund 
adjusted for the actual profit at the end of 
the year. Since 1932, the tax was to be paid 
on a quarterly basis, with payments due 
calculated using income statements and a 
tax adjustment at the end of the year. 
Fourth, the tax was remitted to appro-
priate administrations depending on the 
company’s subordination: to the national 
budget if the company had a national sta-
tus; to republican and local budgets if the 
company was of republican or local sig-
nificance. 
5. Specific mechanism  
of the turnover tax
The Statute on the Turnover Tax2 
set the following principles for calcula-
ting the turnover tax and remitting it to 
the state. 
First, the turnover tax was collected 
when a product was sold by industrial 
associations, state-owned companies 
that were not part of the associations, 
and cooperatives. Government-set prices 
for manufactured goods remained un-
changed regardless of the number of links 
in the supply chain that the goods passed 
through before reaching the consumer. The 
principle had to do with the nature of the 
turnover tax as the centralized net income 
of the state. The net income of society, for 
its part, could only increase through the 
expansion of production and higher labor 
productivity in manufacturing sectors. 
Second, the turnover tax was imposed 
only once in the chain of sales. If compa-
nies handed over products to associations, 
transactions between them were exempt-
ed from the turnover tax. Cooperatives, 
too, were exempt from the turnover tax 
if they sold their products to superior or-
ganizations or organizations of the same 
status. The tax was paid again if a product 
was reworked or subjected to production 
operations that increased its value. The 
2 Regulation on the turnover tax of enterprises 
of the socialized sector. The collection of laws of the 
USSR. 1930, no. 46, art. 477. (In Russ.)
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statute stipulated that packaging, cutting, 
wrapping and packing operations should 
not increase the selling price and levy-
ing the tax as they did not require a lot of 
manpower and did not significantly affect 
the properties of the product. 
Third, the turnover tax was used as an 
instrument for cross-industrial redistribu-
tion of resources. For example, companies 
that produced or extracted critical raw 
materials (ores, flax, hemp, cotton, wool, 
seeds etc.) were exempt from the turn-
over tax. Companies producing agricul-
tural equipment and tools, construction 
machinery, printing companies, bakeries, 
electricity companies and some other pro-
ducers did not pay it either. At the same 
time, clothing and textiles and a number 
of other consumer goods, e.g. chocolate, 
butter, watches, cameras, were taxed at a 
higher rate. Different tax rates helped the 
government ensure a degree of profitabil-
ity for goods and companies that promot-
ed khozraschet (self-financing).
Fourth, the turnover tax was paid in 
a decentralized way; the amount of tax to 
be paid was computed by the company 
considering its actual sales (on each sales 
transaction, with bills submitted to the 
state bank, Gosbank). On the one hand, 
such frequency of tax payments ensured 
regular tax receipts for the government. 
On the other hand, financial resources 
were extracted from enterprises, which 
encouraged them to speed up the cash 
cycle and increase the company’s own 
savings. 
Fifth, the tax revenue was shared 
among the government levels. The tax was 
originally remitted to the national budget, 
which discouraged the local financial au-
thorities from administering it effectively. 
Subsequently, the tax revenue was split 
among the republican and local budgets, 
making them more financially sustainable 
and improving financial control locally.
6. Taxation system as an incentive  
for cutting production costs
The 1930 tax reform established in the 
USSR a simple and fairly rigid tax system 
aimed at encouraging cost cutting in pro-
duction (see Figure 2). 
Sources of investment funds were 
public funds (national budget) as well as 
companies’ own funds (a share of prof-
its). Government-provided funds, which 
played a decisive role, enabled the au-
thorities to redistribute sources of fixed 
investments among industries and territo-
ries. The national budget was replenished 
through the turnover tax and tax charges 
on profits. The levies made it possible to 
efficiently extract a large share of com-
panies’ financial resources into the bud-
get and encouraged companies to reduce 
their cost of production. A low turnover 
tax rate and a company’s own efficient 
performance resulted in growing profits 
and charges on profits, thus ensuring con-
siderable amounts of the company’s own 
sources of fixed investment funds and re-
ceipts for the state. A higher turnover tax 
rate was expected to drive the transfer of 
the resources to the national budget, lead-
ing to lower profits and tax charges on 
profits and thus stimulating cost cutting. 
As a result, all companies regardless 
of their performance contributed to the 
savings fund. Planned prices were set on 
the basis of the average production cost 
in the industry, with the achievements 
of leading companies taken into conside-
ration. 
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At the initial stage of the reforms, a 
considerable number of industrial com-
panies were planned as loss-making ones. 
They received subsidies from the state 
while paying the turnover tax, which re-
sulted in an insignificant share of profits 
in the net income of state-owned manufac-
turing companies and the dominant role 
of the turnover tax in generating public 
revenue. In that period, the turnover tax 
constituted both a part of the public net in-
come and the share of the total social prod-
uct that was utilized for covering produc-
tion costs in heavy industry. In later years, 
when significant advances were made in 
reducing production costs and increasing 
profitability, profits started to grow faster 
than proceeds from the turnover tax and 
the revenue from profit charges started to 
dominate the budget. 
7. Outcomes of the budgetary  
and tax reforms
As a result of the 1930 reforms, in the 
USSR, a unique fiscal mechanism was 
created that proved to be effective later, 
during World War 2. The alignment of 
the tax and budgetary policies enabled 
the country to implement its ambitious 
industrialization plan. The results of the 
tax revenue reform are summarized in 
Table 2. 
The increase in government revenues 
and a practically proportional growth of 
Table 2
Basic parameters of the Soviet state budget in 1928–1940, billion roubles/%
Indicator 1928/1929* 1932 1937 1940 Growth rate
1932/
1928–1929
1937/1932 1940/1937
Public revenues 8.8 38.0 109.3 180.2 4.3 2.9 1.7
100 100 100 100
including
Turnover tax 3.1** 19.6 75.9 105.9 6.3 3.9 1.4
35.5 51.5 69.4 58.7
heavy industry n/a*** 1.4 8.2 10.7 – 5.9 1.3
3.6 7.5 5.9
textiles and clothing n/a 3.6 8.9 16.0 – 2.5 1.8
9.6 8.1 8.9
food industry n/a 9.6 25.3 41.7 – 2.6 1.6
25.3 23.1 23.1
Tax charges on profits 1.4 5.0 9.3 21.7 3.6 1.9 2.3
15.9 13.2 8.5 12.1
heavy industry 0.1 0.4 1.5 1.7 4 3.75 1.1
1.1 1.1 1.4 0.9
textiles and clothing 0.1 0.2 1.0 4.7 2 5 4.7
1.1 0.5 0.9 2.6
food industry 0.01/ 0.2/ 1.5/ 6.0/ 20 7.5 4
0.1 0.5 1.4 3.3
Public spending 8.8 38.0 106.2 174.4 4.3 2.8 1.6
100 100 100 100
financing of industry 1.2 13.3 16.7 n/a 11.1 1.3 –
13.6 35.0 15.7
heavy industry 0.8/ 11.6/ 12.7/ 19.4/ 14.5 1.1 1.5
9.1 30.5 12.0 11.1
textiles and clothing 0.03 0.4 2.0 0.7 13.3 5 0.35
0.3 1.1 1.9 0.4
food industry 0.02 0.5 1.1 1.5 25 2.2 1.4
0.2 1.3 1.0 0.9
* Before 1930, the financial year in the USSR started on 1 October and ended on 30 September;
** Denotes the sum total of the corresponding revenues that in 1930 were consolidated into the 
turnover tax; 
*** The data are not available.
Source: [38].
Journal of Tax Reform. 2019;5(1):70–82
79
ISSN 2412-8872
expenditures was achieved through in-
creasing turnover tax receipts, while tax 
charges on profits were much less sig-
nificant. It should be noted that financial 
resources were redistributed by the cen-
tral administrative unit through the fiscal 
mechanism. For example, the share of the 
turnover tax extracted from the textiles 
and clothing sector and food companies 
made up nearly 35% of the tax revenue, 
while heavy industry accounted for less 
than 4%. Despite significant investments 
and heavy industry expansion in the first 
five-year periods, there were no drastic 
changes to the structure of turnover tax 
receipts. At the same time, profits made 
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Table 3
Capital investment in industrial construction in 1928–1940 and its outcomes 
1928/29–1932 1933–1937 1938–1942 
(plan)
Growth rate
1937/1932 1942/1928
Total fixed investments in indus-
trial construction, billion roubles/%
24.8 58.6 111.9 2.36 4.51
100 100 100
including investments in:
production of means of production 21.3 49.8 93.9 2.3 4.4
85.9 85.0 83.9
production of consumer goods 3.5 8.8 18.0 2.5 5.1
14.1 15.0 16.1
For reference: Effects of capital 
investment:
1928 1932 1937 1940 1940/1928
Gross output in comparable prices, 
billion roubles 
21.4 43.3 95.5 138.5 6.47
Share of manufacturing in GDP, %
Means of production 39.5 53.4 57.8 61.2 +21.7 п.п
Consumer goods 60.5 46.6 42.2 38.8 –21.7 п.п.
Source: [39; 40]
by heavy industry enterprises were com-
parable to profitsin other industries and 
sometimes even exceeded them. The gov-
ernment thus not only subsidized such 
companies, but also provided them with 
extra resources so that companies could 
invest their own savings (Figure 3). 
The analysis of public spending shows 
that expenditures on heavy industry en-
terprises increased at an accelerated pace. 
As a result, investments in the production 
of the means of production doubled. The 
larger share of funds was invested by the 
state in the production of Group A goods 
(means of production), which were then 
distributed among enterprises (Table 3).
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The battle for industrialization 
brought about some major successes. In 
1929, the industrial output was nearly 
twice the level of 1913 before Word War 1. 
The share of industrial production in GDP 
increased from 42.1% in 1913 to 54.5% in 
1929. Annual GDP growth between 1928 
and 1940 was around 4.6% (according to 
earlier estimates, 3 to 6.3%) [41; 42]. 
The redistribution of financial resources 
and accelerated expansion of industry led to 
the redistribution of human resources and a 
higher employment rate, which, in addition 
to the economic effect, had a major social 
impact. The construction of large manu-
facturing companies spurred the construc-
tion of urban agglomerations: the number 
of newly emerging cities and towns in that 
period exceeded 300. Higher population 
density in those areas made health care and 
education more accessible. For example, in 
1928, the share of the urban population in 
the USSR was only 18%. By 1940, over 50% 
of the Soviet population were living in cit-
ies, and the number of people with univer-
sity degrees grew 3.9 times. 
Stimulation of enterprises to cut their 
production costs resulted in the growth of 
average wages and increased productiv-
ity. Per capita consumption in 1938 was 
higher by 22% than in 1928. 
8. Conclusions
The Soviet fiscal policy of 1928–1937, 
which had a comprehensive character, 
proved to be a highly effective instru-
ment for achieving industrialization goals. 
Within this policy, all elements of taxation 
and budgeting were oriented towards one 
major goal. It should be noted that in that 
period the instruments of direct command 
planning played a significant role in eco-
nomic administration. It was, however, 
the use of taxation and budgetary instru-
ments that made the fiscal policy efficient.
The system of direct planning used 
key performance indicators to measure 
the efficiency of industrial enterprises 
while the use of the turnover tax and tax 
charges on profits made it possible to mo-
bilize financial resources of all industries 
and redirect them to one savings fund. 
The fund served as a source of investment, 
ensuring a high pace of economic growth 
and turning the country into an industrial 
power with advanced technological fixed 
capital assets. An important outcome of 
the 1930 fiscal reform was that enterprises 
became more focused on cost cutting and 
on increasing their labor productivity. The 
redistribution of financial resources and 
accelerated industrial growth led to the 
redistribution of human resources and in-
creased employment rate. 
The Soviet economic policy was not, of 
course, devoid of drawbacks. At the initial 
stage, financial resources were mobilized 
at the expense of end consumers, which 
means that the textiles and clothing sec-
tor and the food production sector had to 
bear a higher tax burden, which resulted 
in product shortages and high retail prices 
and thus required direct administrative 
distribution of staple goods (rationing). 
It was impossible to implement such a 
policy without rigid administrative con-
trol. Nevertheless, the economic growth 
in heavy industry reached 10–16% a year 
at the beginning of industrialization and 
had a multiplicative effect on the entire 
economy. 
The desired effect was achieved really 
fast, but the fiscal reform also had its dark-
er side as the mobilization of resources of-
ten happened to the detriment of custom-
ers. The tasks and goals of the economic 
policy should have been adjusted more 
frequently by taking into consideration 
social well-being and the needs of the con-
sumer goods sector. 
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